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Abstract: Based on fieldwork conducted between March and November 2011, this article argues that 
the popularity of remixing has led to a restructuring of compensation for producers of remixes within 
the context of electronic dance music (EDM). This article presents the different ways producers of EDM 
are currently compensated for their remixes, and how this compensation differs from the payment and 
intellectual property protections given for the composition of original songs. This article concludes by 
discussing how these producers are beginning to negotiate deals with labels and artists that will result in 
greater financial security and better protection of remixers’ intellectual property rights.
Résumé: En se basant sur un travail de terrain effectué entre mars et novembre 2011, cet article a pour 
argument que la popularité du remix a conduit à la restructuration des revenus de ceux qui en produisent 
dans le contexte de l’electronic dance music, ou techno. Cet article présente les différents moyens par lesquels 
les producteurs de techno perçoivent des revenus pour leurs remix, et la façon dont ces indemnisations 
diffèrent des redevances et des protections de propriété intellectuelle obtenues pour la composition de 
chansons originales. Cet article se conclut par une discussion de la façon dont ces producteurs commencent 
à négocier des contrats avec les maisons de disques et les artistes afin de s’assurer une plus grande sécurité 
financière et une meilleure protection de leurs droits de propriété intellectuelle.
The remix, one of the more prominent and ubiquitous innovations of the contemporary music industry, remains largely misunderstood both 
within and outside music scholarship. Remixes are frequently perceived and 
characterized as violations of slowly evolving copyright law for the benefit 
of amateur bedroom producers, who are either lauded as champions for 
creativity of expression, or denigrated as petty thieves who deny original 
artists their financial due (e.g., Gunkel 2012; O’Brien and Fitzgerald 2006). 





















































































been composed by professional electronic dance music (EDM) producers 
with the express permission of the copyright holders, who commission 
these remixes with the intention of using the new versions as promotional 
material for the original song and artist. Because remixes are used in this 
way, the producers of remixes often find themselves making precarious 
financial arrangements with labels that fail to reflect the music industry’s 
new dependence on remixing as a way to promote the artists signed to 
their labels. In response to the instability of these financial arrangements, 
remix producers are becoming more resourceful, carving out new ways to 
trade labour for compensation that reflects their changing role in the music 
industry as well as being more fair to the producers.
 Based on interviews with 29 professional DJs and producers1 and 13 
record label executives,2 this article focuses on the ways in which producers 
of remixed music are compensated for their work. I will discuss some of 
the ways producers of EDM are traditionally paid for their remixes, and 
will introduce some of the more innovative solutions to the problem of 
compensation for music that continues to be considered legally derivative 
despite the original contributions of remixers. I will continue by discussing 
some of the gains being made by remixers with respect to legally protecting 
their intellectual property, which may be a reflection of changing attitudes 
towards derivativeness in music. To conclude, I will offer some opinions 
about what record labels could be doing to ensure that remixers are 
compensated fairly for their labour. 
What Is a Remix?
Before addressing the matter of compensation, it is first important to 
understand how the term “remix” will be used throughout this essay. 
Remix, a term with origins in the dub studios of Jamaica in the early 
1960s and, later, the underground nightclubs of the disco era (Brewster 
and Broughton 2000, 2010; Veal 2007), has more recently been applied to 
a broad swath of cultural expression that has little to no relationship with 
music (Diakopoulos et al 2007, 153; Knobel and Lankshear 2008, 22; 
Konstantinova n.d., accessed July 12, 2012; Lessig 2008; Manovich 2007, 
5-8; Nesheim 2009; Rife 2012). Moreover, it is exceptionally common 
for scholars who do talk about remixing in a musical context to conflate 
remix with other derivative musical expressions such as mashup, bootleg 
and re-edit (Chanbonpin 2011, 20-21; Floyd et al 2007; Gunkel 2008, 
2012; Hughes and Lang 2006; Knobel and Lankshear 2007; Lessig 2008). 
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My use of the terms “derivative” and “original” throughout this article are 
meant to distinguish the process of composing remixes from the process 
of composing non-remixed music. In other words, remixes are only 
derivative with respect to the way they are composed—using previously 
recorded music as their compositional basis—and not necessarily because 
of their content, which is often very innovative and original sounding. 
So-called original music—that is, songs composed without the use of pre- 
recorded musical material—is not necessarily more original-sounding 
than remixed music and, very often, can be derivative of another artist’s 
musical ideas or style without outright copying. In sum, these terms are 
used as they are in this article for the purpose of clarity and not as a 
comment on the value of remixed versus non-remixed music. Examples 
of what I have termed “remix analogues”—derivative songs whose 
compositional process is similar to but ultimately different from that of 
a remix—includes mashups, which are songs composed by combining 
two or more songs in their original recorded form together; re-edits, 
which are songs that have been cut up and reconfigured by a producer 
using source material culled from the multi-track master tapes; and 
bootlegs, songs created using newly composed material in combination 
with parts of an original song that have been separated from that song 
through equalization of the original recording rather than through the 
multi-track master tapes. Further, in the case of bootlegs, the producer 
has not obtained permission from the copyright holder to use the source 
material (Hyndman 2012: 25-36). While these song types are certainly 
similar to the remix, they differ with respect to the process by which they 
are composed, an important distinction that not only defines remixing 
as separate from other derivative expression but also helps to determine 
whether or not a particular derivative musical expression is in danger of 
breaking the law.3 Therefore, the term remix will be used throughout this 
essay to refer to a song created using a combination of newly composed 
musical material and previously existing recorded sounds. While remixes 
are most typically found in the popular music realm, remixing is defined 
primarily by the producer’s treatment of recorded music rather than by 
a particular sonic aesthetic. Unlike a bootleg or mashup, which isolate 
certain parts of a finished recording using a technique called equalization,4 
a remix makes use of multi-track master tapes, colloquially referred to by 
producers as “stems,” to isolate sounds from a recording in combination 
with newly composed musical material.
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Compensation Categories
Based on the responses of my interlocutors, compensation for remixes 
occurs either as direct payment (i.e., money), indirect payment (e.g., 
gigs), or no payment at all. Within the broad continuum represented by 
these imbursement categories, variations in compensation type tend to be 
determined by factors such as a producer’s relative fame and/or popularity, 
the length of time a producer has been involved in the industry as a 
professional, or the types of remixes and remix analogues they produce. In 
the case of producers who have established a strong following and are not 
necessarily worried about launching a successful career, the building and 
maintenance of a standard of living that allows these producers to perform 
their craft on a full-time basis can establish for them whether or not it is in 
their interest to accept commissions for remixes. Seasoned producers, such 
as popular Boston-based DJ and producer Juan MacLean, argue that the time 
it takes to make a remix is often not reflected in the sum of money offered 
to the remixer by the artist or record label requesting the work, and this can 
be the decisive factor in determining whether or not it is in the producer’s 
interest to create a remix. MacLean’s concerns about time and money are 
related to the fact that DJing and song production are the primary means by 
which he supports himself financially:
Right off the bat ... there is a money issue. Because ... when 
you cross that threshold from doing music as a hobby to doing 
music as the way you pay your rent and support yourself, I just 
don’t have the time, or I can’t afford to do a remix if I’m not 
being paid a certain amount of money. I mean, they take a while, 
they generally take two weeks to be in my studio, so what might 
sound like a lot of money to do something like that, say $1000 
or something like that, when you start breaking it down over the 
course of a couple weeks and by the hour, I could probably make 
more money working at Starbucks or something, and certainly 
not enough to justify the time. (MacLean 2011)
Despite the real financial concerns faced by producers everyday 
(discussed in more detail below), many producers turn down opportunities 
to remix songs they did not enjoy or engage with, sometimes even when the 
request for a remix was accompanied by the promise of financial recompense. 
Toronto-based DJ and producer Robb G tells of such an occurrence:
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There’s been a case where I was asked to remix something once 
and I started remixing and working on it, and I found myself 
muting more and more pieces of the original that I was supposed 
to be remixing. And then at the end I had everything, except for 
one little indistinguishable sound, muted from the original, and I 
just went back to the label and said “I’m sorry, I can’t do this, I’m 
not going to do this,” and I just got rid of that last sound from the 
track and I released it as an original instead. (Robb G 2011)
In Robb G’s case, all was not lost with respect to time and money: despite 
having turned down the money and the opportunity offered by a record label 
in exchange for a remix, he was able to release the song as an original track, 
presumably making money from its sale (Robb G 2011). 
Though many producers prioritize working with compelling source 
material before making a remix, producers can be motivated to rework 
songs they do not like specifically because the requests are accompanied by a 
financial supplement. As New York-based DJ and producer Gobs the Zombie 
explains, “If there’s money involved, then I’m more likely to say yes regardless 
of whether I like the tune as a whole or not, but there needs to be something 
I can work with” (Gobs the Zombie 2011). Philadelphia-based producer DJ 
Apt One takes a similar viewpoint, noting that there are very good financial 
reasons to consent to remixing songs that are not in keeping with a producer’s 
particular aesthetic sensibilities:
[Sometimes] there are people you just don’t say “no” to. There are 
songs you may not want to work with, but I mean sometimes you 
just can’t say “no.” ... If Britney Spears asks you to do some work, 
I’m sure that the money is good, number one, but number two ... 
considering the fact that nobody buys music and ... you’re really 
scratching it out, I could see a lot of arguments for doing that 
even if you were resistant to the song. I mean, it’s a good way to 
guarantee that you’re going to be able to put food in your mouth 
for the next year. I can also see artistic arguments for saying that’s 
not a good idea, but it’s a consideration you have to weigh. (DJ 
Apt One 2011)
As DJ Apt One notes, the paucity of financial security associated with making 
a living as a producer of electronic music during a time when there are fewer 
people actually purchasing music while producers continue to “[scratch] it 
out,” can make it very difficult to turn down an offer of work for reasons of 
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artistic disagreement when the money being offered for a remix is enough to 
ensure at least short-term fiscal stability.
The extent to which the remixing activities of producers are motivated 
by the promise of cash depends primarily on two factors: first, how long the 
producer in question has been involved in the electronic dance music scene; 
and second, whether or not song production and DJing is their primary means 
of supporting themselves financially. Furthermore, there exists a distinction 
between how producers tend to be compensated for their remix work versus 
the payment they receive for original productions. This difference is significant 
because, first, compensation for the work of remixers includes a number 
of different funding models, including work-for-hire contracts/lump-sum 
payment, speculative contracts and the less common publishing and licensing 
contracts. Compensation for the production of original tracks, by contrast, 
tends to be limited to publishing and licensing agreements that are largely 
speculative insofar as income is not guaranteed, while also reflecting the 
opportunity for producers to receive full financial credit for their work when 
released for sale. Second, the difference between the funding of original tracks 
versus remixes is noteworthy because it speaks volumes about how both the 
record industry and consumers value the work of remixers, as well as how 
firmly entrenched the standard definitions of “originality” and “authenticity” 
remain despite the near-ubiquity of derivative cultural artifacts and how 
influential they have proven to be over at least the last decade.
With respect to types of payment for remix work, half of the producers 
surveyed cited receiving some form of direct financial compensation—that is, 
monetary payment for services rendered—from record labels or the song’s 
original artist when commissioned to make a remix. For a majority of these 
producers, payment for remixes comes in the form of a lump sum of money 
that is paid either up front or upon receipt of the remix. As observed by Juan 
MacLean earlier, the amount of this flat fee is often not enough to justify 
the time and the effort required to make a remix. Consequently, it is slowly 
becoming more common for producers to negotiate contracts that include a 
percentage of publishing and licensing rights that will earn royalty payments 
for the remixer, often in addition to an agreed-upon flat fee negotiated by the 
remixer. 
These types of agreements, which resemble the contracts generally 
offered by labels for the production of original songs, are more commonly 
obtained by producers who have been active in professional EDM production 
for a longer period of time. MacLean, for example, has been making remixes 
since the early 2000s, and characterizes himself as belonging to “the upper 
levels of remixing” (MacLean 2011), because the volume of requests for 
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remixes fielded by his manager reflect a high demand for his work. Due to 
this demand and his fame as a remixer, MacLean is able to negotiate contracts 
for payment that include publishing and licensing rights of up to 50% of the 
remix’s total profits (MacLean 2011). This type of contract is exceptional 
insofar as it appears to represent a shift towards acknowledging that producers 
of remixes are entitled to copyright protections on par with those afforded 
to original songs, signaling a greater acceptance by the music industry, 
however gradual, of the idea that a derivative work such as a remix is not 
necessarily an unoriginal song and perhaps deserves to be acknowledged as 
such. Moreover, the granting of publishing and licensing rights to producers 
of remixes may indicate a great respect for the remixing producer, in the least, 
and a growing acknowledgment of the importance of the remix in the new 
music industry model, at best. While licensing rights are certainly not the 
norm among respondents who reported receiving payment for their remix 
work, other producers such as Barbi Castelvi (2011), Cozmic Cat (2011) and 
Thee-O (2011), spoke of having negotiated royalty payments constituting 
some percentage of a remix’s total sales.
For the other half of this group of respondents, it was common for 
producers to receive no payment at all for their remix work, sometimes even in 
instances when they were contracted to make remixes by record labels. These 
types of contracts, called “speculative,” or “spec,” are ones in which producers 
commissioned by record labels are only paid for their remix work if the record 
label likes the song enough to release it— many songs commissioned on spec 
never see the light of day—and only if the song is commercially popular. The 
nature of the speculative contracts offered to remixers differ somewhat from 
the speculative nature of some publishing and licensing contracts offered to 
producers of original music: while the release of original songs is guaranteed to 
net an income for producers once the song begins to sell, there is no guarantee 
that a remix commissioned on a speculative contract will even be released by 
a label. Therefore, speculative contracts offered to producers can deter them 
from making remixes for labels, especially when the producers in question 
have had negative experiences working under speculative contracts. Toronto-
based DJ, producer and record label head Barbi Castelvi cites being hired on 
spec in the past as one of the reasons she and her label partner choose not to 
make remixes frequently or to release remixes on a label other than their own:
Basically, you’re doing a remix for free and whatever net royalties 
come in, you get a cut of it. We’re very wary about doing remixes 
for other labels besides our own because we find we never get 
our money back for it. ... A couple times we’ve done [remixes] 
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on spec with the promise that we will be able to put it out on our 
label, and we’ve had lawyers basically block us from doing it, no 
you can’t release your own song, yet they won’t release it on any 
label. (Castelvi 2011)
In other words, speculative contracts are contentious and frequently put 
producers in precarious situations that leave them with little or no control 
over their work, as well as taking time away from the production of other 
work that might be a better fiscal return on their time investment. If the label 
in question decides not to release the remix, the producer does not make 
any money. Moreover, the commissioning label holds all rights to the remix, 
which means that the producer is unable to sell their work to someone else 
who might be willing to pay for it.
Speculative contracts notwithstanding, a number of producers find 
more circuitous ways to profit indirectly from their remixes. Especially in the 
case of bootlegs and mashups, direct payment for remix work is simply not 
possible because the songs in question have been revised without the producer 
having been granted permission to do so. Despite this problem, producers can 
often find opportunities for indirect financial compensation by being hired 
for gigs based on their unique treatments of original songs via bootlegging or 
mashup creation. For example, DJ and producer ViVi Diamond is well known 
in Toronto for her mashups, both live and composed/recorded. Because the 
vast majority of her mashups and remixes are created from music she has not 
been granted permission to use, she is unable to release them for sale. Rather 
than considering this a loss of time and money, however, she argues that her 
bootlegs serve the purpose of generating DJ work:
Generally, the way that I justify all the time that I put into 
[remixing] is in shows.... I don’t actually make any money off the 
music I make, but I make money off of DJing, and I make money 
off of shows, and I make money off of these things where I’m 
going to these things where I play my music, and I wouldn’t make 
as much money off of these things if I didn’t have the basis to be 
creating this music for myself. (ViVi Diamond 2011)
This view was also supported by interviews with other producers, such as 
Simone Bennussi of Reset! (2011), Katzenwaffe (2011) and Rhubix (2011). 
Despite all the possible ways to make money and/or receive institutional 
support for the making of remixes, many producers simply do not get paid at 
all for their remixed music. Those producers who find themselves in situations 
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of non-payment offered novel ways to justify doing this work without feeling 
as though the endeavour was a waste of their time. For example, a number of 
producers cited remix swapping, essentially an exchange of labour between 
producers who make remixes of each other’s original songs, as one way to make 
remixed music without payment in a manner that is fair to all parties. Remix 
swapping seems to be most popular amongst European producers, supported 
by interviews with the likes of Swedish producer Olle Cornéer of Dada Life 
(2011), English producer Nat Self of Zombie Disco Squad (2011), and Veteran 
Swedish producer Håkan Lidbo (2011), who noted that remix swapping 
constitutes a more equitable exchange of goods for labour. This perspective is 
the result of a dramatic decrease in the money available to producers for their 
remix work over the last decade. Lidbo, who has been producing electronic 
music since 1988, has observed significant changes in the ways producers are 
compensated for their remixes. To summarize, he frequently ends up working 
for free, and when he does get paid the money is not very good:
When I was releasing a lot of records ... and when I was touring 
a lot, the record labels that released underground electronic 
club music had some sort of budget because people were buying 
music, basically. So there was a budget for remixes. Nowadays, I 
get maybe 25% of what I used to get, or even less. (Lidbo 2011)
The amount of money offered to a producer in exchange for a remix can 
vary widely depending on various factors, but perhaps the biggest of these 
is the relative fame of the producer in question. A producer of the calibre of 
Juan MacLean, for instance, will earn approximately $5000 (USD) per remix 
commissioned by a major label, and anywhere between $2000 and $3000 
per remix when commissioned by an independent label (MacLean 2012). By 
contrast, a lesser-known producer like Toronto’s Cozmic Cat has commanded 
fees as high as $1500 per remix from a major label, but also acknowledges 
that the fee offered per remix can be as low as $50 (Cozmic Cat 2012). For 
Lidbo, a remix commissioned as recently as eight or nine years ago would 
have earned him around €1000 per remix. Today, the current average offer he 
receives for requests for remixing are usually somewhere in the neighborhood 
of €200-300 per remix (Lidbo 2012).
As Lidbo observes, changes in the compensation structure for producers, 
even those with long and well-established careers, have come about because 
of changes in technology, particularly the shift from physical to digital media, 
which has made it easier for producers to make and distribute music, and for 
consumers to acquire music for free:
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HL: But it also has to do with technology, there are so many 
digital tools to make remixes really fast today, so that sort of sets 
the price and the market. There are thousands and thousands of 
people who make music, so the competition is a bit different 
situation than only a few years ago [sic]. I mean, that also decides 
the price, I guess.
SH: So are you saying that the increase in digital technology and 
the digitization of music has decreased the price tag for creating 
songs?
HL: I would say [it decreases the] average price, because most of 
the music is made for free and not paid for [by a record label], 
and the remixes are made for free and the tracks are not paid for 
because people get music in other ways, by promos or Pirate Bay 
[a torrent website for illegal downloads] or whatever they choose 
to get the music. Not so long time ago [sic], people paid for their 
music, especially music made for DJs because they wanted that 
on vinyl, and so there was a lot of people making music then, 
but in order to make it to a record label where your music was 
actually released on vinyl, you actually had to keep up some sort 
of level, or some sort of name. Today, anyone can make music, 
which is great, which is what music is meant to be. So I’m very 
happy about this development, but I would say that probably the 
number of producers has increased by 500%, that would be my 
estimation, and the amount of money that is involved in the music 
business hasn’t increased. (Lidbo 2011)
What Lidbo describes here is the effect of digitization on the value of music 
making in general and on remixing in particular. Not only is there an influx 
of producers who have increasingly easy access to the tools of production and 
the ability to widely distribute their music over the Internet without the help 
or support of a record label, there is also a growing culture of consumers who 
are increasingly resistant to the idea of paying for the music they want to listen 
to, in combination with a music industry that is not making as much money 
as it did prior to the digitization and virtualization of music distribution. As 
such, the going rate of payment for certain types of productions, especially 
remixes, decreases dramatically because there are more people (mainly young 
producers) trying to break into the scene, willing to work for free and give 
music away without being concerned with recouping any costs (time, money, 
etc.) associated with creating a remix. Even when producers are not keen to 
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distribute their music without charge to the consumer, technologies like the 
torrent site Pirate Bay are very effective at circumventing the requirement 
that audiences pay for what they consume.
Cautious Optimism
Despite the financially precarious nature of speculative contracts, remix 
swapping, indirect forms of compensation and lump sum payments that fail 
to accurately reflect the labour of remix production, there is reason to be 
cautiously optimistic that things are changing for the better. Though still 
uncommon on a larger scale, a small number of producers reported being able 
to negotiate contracts that include a percentage of publishing and licensing 
rights that will earn royalty payments for the remixer, often in addition to an 
agreed-upon flat fee. These types of agreements, which resemble the contracts 
generally offered by labels for the production of original songs, are most easily 
obtained by producers who have been active in professional EDM production 
for a longer period of time. However, I want to stress, again, that publishing and 
licensing contracts remain rare and tend to only be offered to producers with 
established careers and fan bases; the fact that such contracts are offered at all 
may suggest that record labels are beginning to acknowledge that producers 
contribute original musical ideas to their remixes, and that remixed music is 
ostensibly an asynchronous collaboration between two parties who each bring 
something new and original to the table.
Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that the law may be beginning 
to favour claims of originality in remixing, albeit slowly and with many 
false starts. When I was conducting my fieldwork, I learned from one of my 
informants of a lawsuit between a highly respected producer of electronic 
music and a popular indie band. The band had commissioned a remix from 
the producer and, though the producer attempted to get the band to sign a 
publishing and licensing contract, the band refused and an agreement was 
never reached. Shortly afterwards, the remix was licensed for commercial 
use and, because the band quietly ignored the producer’s request for a fair 
financial agreement, the band collected significant royalties while the remixer 
got nothing. The lawsuit, launched by the producer in a country outside of 
North America, argued that it was his original contributions to the remix, 
and not the source material, that made it attractive for commercial use, and 
the lawsuit was eventually settled out-of-court in favour of the producer. 
The settlement also included a non-disclosure clause, which is why I am 
unable to provide more detail about the producer, the band or the context 
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of its commercial use, despite having had this information confirmed for 
me by the producer who launched the suit. This anecdote illustrates some 
of the gains being made by remixers in protecting their interests while 
also demonstrating that there is a long way to go before such cases become 
the norm: the lawsuit settled in favour of the remixer demonstrates that 
it is plausible to argue that remixes meet the legal standard of originality 
applied to non-derivative works. Indeed, even some legal experts agree that, 
if tested in court, it is probable that a remix could meet the standard of 
originality, defined as requiring a “modicum of creativity,” applied to non-
derivative works (Sinnreich 2010: 102). However, the non-disclosure clause 
also ensures that no one can learn the details of this particular case, and that 
future lawsuits will be unable to refer to the potential precedent set by this 
example in order to support a remixer’s claim to ownership over original 
contributions to a derivative work. 
 
A Potential Solution
Not being a legal scholar, it is difficult for me to make suggestions about what 
a definitively correct solution to the problem of fairly compensating remixers 
for their remixes might look like. A partial solution, however, would be for 
record labels to treat remixed songs the same way they do original tracks: 
as commodities to be sold to customers. All 13 record label executives who 
participated in this study stated that the primary purpose of the remix within 
their business model is to promote the new releases of artists signed to their 
label. In promotion of these new releases, remixes are treated as disposable and 
interchangeable commodities that are given away for free in the sometimes vain 
hope that a listener who hears the remix first will be as, or more, interested 
in the original version that sounds markedly different. However, there was 
no real consensus regarding the efficacy of remixes as promotional material, 
or on their enhanced value for the remixers themselves. For example, Udi 
Radomsky, head of the London-based labels Lo and Loaf Recordings, observes 
that remixes tend to lead to the sale of the original song rather than increasing 
the following of the remixer:
From our experience, remixed songs are less than 1% of our 
sales. They are useful to raise the [remix] artist profile, but not 
at the level of sales. I think this is because we are very much an 
artist-driven label and the way remixes are used these days for 
promotional material.... [Remixes] are extra-helpful in acquiring 
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coverage and “spread the word” [about new original releases] by 
supplying extra content to blogs and independent radio stations. 
(Radomsky 2011)
By contrast, Barbi Castelvi, of the Toronto-based label Intelligenix, sees a 
strong connection between sales of remixes and interest in the remixing 
producer’s other work: “[The] remix artist is lending their sound to that 
[original] song, so when someone hears a remix, a lot of the time it’s 
because they like the remixer’s sound. They’ll buy everything that remixer’s 
done” (Castelvi 2011; my emphasis). Again, the key difference here is in how 
the remixes are treated by record labels: if a remix is first distributed for 
free in order to drive interest in and sales of the original song, and is later 
sold alongside the original song, it stands to reason that remix sales would 
diminish. Labels that treat the remix as something to be sold alongside the 
original song from the outset, however, tended to observe consumption 
habits that included both an interest in the original song, and an interest in 
the remixing producer’s other work.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to shed light on ways in which producers 
of electronic dance music are compensated for their remixes. Though money 
was only one of several motivations for creating remixed music, it will come 
as no surprise that financial matters significantly influence how and why 
electronic dance music producers make remixes. The question of appropriate 
compensation for remixed music is an especially interesting one, given the 
extent to which both the funding and dissemination of electronic music within 
contemporary culture are driven by technological advances that make it easier 
than ever before to both make and consume music illegally. Moreover, the 
blurry legal space occupied by remixing makes it easier to exploit the labour 
of producers who are seeking to gain a foothold in the saturated EDM market 
or simply make a decent living. It is difficult to tell what the future holds 
for remixing as part of the music industry, but there are encouraging signs 
that point towards a greater acceptance of derivativeness as an important 
component of contemporary music culture. The use of remixed music by 
record labels serves as a reminder of how derivative works have been valued 
in the recent past, and shows how such appraisals may be changing for the 
better and in favour of remixers.  
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Notes
1. It is necessary to point out that the terms “DJ” and “producer,” though fre-
quently used interchangeably, refer to distinct roles in the world of EDM. The term 
DJ, at its core, refers to a performer of recorded music. A producer, on the other 
hand, is someone who composes music. Music production in the EDM context 
extends to include the composition of both original and derivative songs, includ-
ing remixes and mashups. Therefore, the use of the term “remixer” throughout this 
article is meant to distinguish the producer of the source material from the produc-
er of the remix or mashup. In other words, remixers are still producers. For more, 
see Brewster and Broughton 2003; Fikentscher 2000; and Hyndman 2012.
2.  A more detailed description of my research process and how respondents 
were recruited can be found in Hyndman 2013.
3.  Examples of what I have termed “remix analogues”—derivative songs whose 
compositional process is similar to but ultimately different from that of a remix—
includes mashups, which are songs composed by combining two or more songs in 
their original recorded form together; re-edits, which are songs that have been cut 
up and reconfigured by a producer using source material culled from the multi-
track master tapes; and bootlegs, songs created using newly composed material 
in combination with parts of an original song that have been separated from that 
song through equalization of the original recording rather than through the multi-
track master tapes. Further, in the case of bootlegs, the producer has not obtained 
permission from the copyright holder to use the source material. A more detailed 
discussion of the differences between remixes and remix analogues can be found in 
Hyndman 2012, 25-36.
4. Equalization, or EQing, is the process of adjusting the amplitude of sound 
signals at specific frequencies. Originally used to counteract the distorted frequency 
response of early microphone technology, EQing is now regularly employed by DJs 
and producers in order to rebalance elements of recorded music by changing the 
volume of component frequencies in a sound source or altering timbres in a record-
ing. For more information, see Hodgson 2010, 73-79.
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